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COMMIENT
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE INDIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
When an employment contract involving both Indiana and
foreign elements comes before the Indiana Appellate Court,
two particularly vexatious problems of conflict of laws may
confront that body in applying the Indiana Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The more frequent question involves a deter-
mination of whether a particular employment relationship
is covered by the Indiana statute, a determination made more
difficult by the failure of that statute to define the contracts
to which its coverage extends. A second and less familiar
question concerns the possibility of an employee's recover-
ing successive awards for the same injury, under both the
Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act and a similar statute
of another state.
This comment will examine these two distinct, although
related, questions. First an attempt will be made to dis-
cover those judicial principles which have determined what
contracts of employment-are covered by the Indiana act and
if the statutory coverage is found to be inadequate to pro-
pose methods by.which that coverage can be extended. Sec-
ondly, attention will be directed to the extraterritorial effects
which the act of one state, or an award thereunder, may have
on compensation awards of other states.
I
The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act' provides
that "Every contract of service between any employer and
employee covered by this act . . . shall be presumed to have
been made subject to the provisions of this act."2 Because
the statute does not further describe the contracts of service
involved, the task of formulating legal principles which will
single out those contracts has fallen to the Indiana Appellate
1. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1201 to 40-1704 (Burns Repl. 1940). The
first workmen's compensation act was passed in Indiana in 1915
(Ind. Acts 1915, c. 106, §§ 1-82). Numerous amendments were
made to the act, and in 1929 it was totally revised (Ind. Acts
1929, c. 172, §§ 1-76).
2. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1204 (Burns Repl. 1940). (Italics sup-
plied).
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Court.3 The problem of coverage arises of course only when
extraterritorial factors are present (e.g., formation of the
contract outside the state, or performance outside the state,
or residence of the parties outside the state4) since a con-
tract made and performed wholly within Indiana between
Indiana residents clearly falls within the act and presents
no conflict of laws question.
In a typical conflict of laws case involving contract
litigation 5 the problem of determining which state's laws
will govern can be solved by applying one of the following
rules: (1) That jurisdiction's law which the parties intended
should apply is the governing law; (2) The law of that juris-
diction wherein the contract was performed is the govern-
ing law; (3) The law of that jurisdiction in which the con-
tract was formed is the governing law.6 Although the Indi-
ana Appellate Court has not always been consistent in its
choice of one of these rules in its workmen's compensation
decisions, the cases indicate the court favors the second rule
-that the law of place of performance controls.7
In the leading case of Hagenbeck & Great Wallace Show
Co. v. Randalls an employment contract was formed in Ohio
by the circus company, an Indiana corporation, for work to
be performed in Indiana and certain other states. The em-
3. The Workmen's Compensation Act provides for an appeal from
an award of the Industrial Board "to the Appellate Court for
errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern
appeals in ordinary civil actions." IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1512
(Burns Repl. 1940). The Supreme Court of Indiana held, in
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N. E.2d 399
(1939), that the jurisdiction of the appellate court was not ex-
clusive, and that a transfer to the supreme court was possible.
See 16 IND. L. J. 397 (1941). However, as a matter of practice,
the appellate court is the judicial body which handles the pre-
ponderance of the appealed 'compensation cases.
4. The Indiana act expressly provides that in order to recover an
award in Indiana it is not necessary that the injury or death
resulting from the injury occur in Indiana. IND. STAT. ANN. §
40-1220 (Burns Repl. 1940). See Ben Wolf Truck Lines v. Bailey,
102 Ind. App. 208, 1 N. E.2d 660 (1935).
5. Workmen's compensation statutes are generally phrased in terms
of contract liability.
6. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 201-211 (1937); GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 274-280 (2d ed. 1938). See also Beale, What Law Gov-
erns the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. Rnv. 260 (1910).
7. Elkhart Sawmill Co. v. Skinner, 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E.2d
412 (1942); Calkins v. Service Spring Co., 103 Ind. App. 257, 7
N. E.2d 549 (1936); Bement Oil Corp. v. Cubbison, 84 Ind. App.
22, 149 N. E. 919 (1925).
8. 75 Ind. App. 417, 126 N. E. 501 (1920).
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ployee was killed in Indiana while performing his duties. Al-
though the parties had stipulated that the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia should govern the terms of the contract
the Indiana court affirmed the compensation award, finding
that the Indiana act was superimposed upon the Ohio con-
tract because the employer was an Indiana corporation. In
refusing to accept the rule that the intention of the parties
determined the governing law the court indicated its prefer-
ence for the place of performance rule. Subsequently that
rule was affirmatively applied in Johns-Manville v. Thrane9
where an award was allowed under a contract formed in Illi-
nois to be performed in Indiana. In a third case recovery
9. 80 Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229 (1923). "... we hold that a
contract made in one state in contemplation of performance in
another, is subject to -the law of the state in which it is to be
performed." Id. at 434.
An inclination to depart from this principle appears in the
case of Leader Specialty Co. v. Chapman, 85 Ind. App. 296, 152
N. E. 872 (1926). There the court said by way of dictum that
where a contract of service is to be performed wholly outside
the state a stipulation by the parties that the provisions of the
Indiana act should apply will be effective. This statement was
a complete gratuity since there was no such stipulation in the
contract. In its absence the court assumed the parties contracted
with reference to the law of the place of performance-an applica-
tion of the conflicts rule of "intent of the parties."
And an uncritical allegiance to the rule was responsible for
the unusual invocation of the "privileges and immunities" clause
of the United States Constitution. in Bement Oil Corp. v. Cub-
bison, 84 Ind. App. 22, 149 N. E. 919 (1925). The court held the
Indiana act inapplicable to an employee injured outside the state
in the course of his employment under a contract neither made
nor to be performed within Indiana. The employer's principal
place of business was in Indiana and the employee was an Indiana
resident, but the court refused to allow that fact to control. To
do so, the court said, would be granting rights to a citizen of this
state which would not, under the same facts, be granted to a
citizen of another state; i.e., an Illinois resident, for example,
could not recover under the Indiana act if no worlk was performed
in Indiana and the contract was not made in Indiana. The
court's only authority for its conclusion that a nonresident em-
ployee would be barred from recovery under the Indiana act,
absent execution or performance of the contract in Indiana, was
the case of Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Ind. Acci. Comm'n, 184 Cal.
26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920). That case only holds that a work-
men's compensation act cannot deny its benefits to nonresidents
who are injured within the state and at the same time grant its
benefits to residents who are injured outside the state without
violating the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal
Constitution. Not only is that case itself supported by very slight
authority, see Note, 12 A. L. R. 1207 (1921), but there was no
showing before the Indiana court that the Indiana act was dis-
criminatory. Moreover, the Indiana act specifically provides for
compensation even though the injury occurs outside the state.
Cf. note 4 supra.
[VoL 24
COMMENT
was denied on the sole ground that no performance within
Indiana was contemplated.'- It therefore appears that the
conflict of laws rule requiring partial performance within
the state has been adopted by the Indiana court as one of the
principles which determines whether an award will be avail-
able under the Indiana act for a given contract of service."
Under this rule if no performance occurs within Indiana the
Indiana act will not apply even though both parties to the
contract were Indiana residents.
The Indiana court apparently has not considered the per-
formance principle alone a sufficient basis to justify appli-
cation of the act. Instead the court has created a second
principle which requires that the employer be "localized" in
Indiana before the act will apply. This requirement is de-
fined in an appellate court exposition of its reasons for hold-
ing localization necessary: ". . . Indiana cannot regulate the
conduct of citizens of foreign states . . . and the language
of said section as to employers and employees who shall be
deemed to have accepted its provisions, manifestly was in-
tended only to apply to such persons as were residents of this
state ... or, maintained an office and place for doing busi-
ness within the state."'12 The requirement of localization has
10. Elkhart Sawmill Co. v. Skinner, 111 Ind. App. 695, '42 N. E.2d
412 (1942). There the employee was a Michigan resident, the
contract was formed in Michigan, and the employer was a resi-
dent of Indiana.
11. See Shelby M'f'g Co. v. Harris, 112 Ind. App. 627, 44 N. E.2d 315
(1942); Calkins v. Service Spring Co., 103 Ind. App. 257, 7 N.
E.2d 54 (1936). This requirement need not be as restrictive as
it seems since "performance" could be broadly interpreted. At
least one case has held that a salesman whose territory was in
Michigan but who was required to attend a sales meeting in
Indiana was covered by the act. See Fisher v. Mossman-Yarnelle
Co., 105 Ind. App. 22, 13 N. E.2d 343 (1938). On this point, one
Indiana case is either inconsistent or it broadens the requirement
to include performance outside the state if it is "adjunct" to per-
formance in Indiana. In Premier Construction Co. v. Grinstead,
91 Ind. App. 163, 170 N. E. 561 (1930), a resident of Kentucky
contracted in Indiana to do work in Indiana, Kentucky, Illinois
and elsewhere. The injury occurred in Kentucky, and in a pro-
ceeding under the Indiana act the court held that the Indiana
Industrial Board did not have jurisdiction because the work in
Kentucky was not "adjunct" to an Indiana project. There has
been no further definition of the meaning of "adjunct."
12. Darsch v. Thearle Duffield Co., 77 Ind. App. 357, 360, 117 N. E.
531 (1922). Cf. Bishop v. International Sugar Feed Co., 87 Ind.
App. 509, 162 N. E. 71 (1928); Norman v. Hartman Furniture
Co., 84 Ind. App. 173, 150 N. E. 416 (1926). But see Johns-
Manville, Inc. v. Thrane, 80 Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229 (1923).
There a contract was formed in Illinois for performance in Illi-
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also been justified on the ground that a foreign employer
could not be presumed to have accepted the act's provisions. 13
However, no reason has been given which would explain why
one who contracts either within or without Indiana for per-
formance in Indiana should not be presumed to have accepted
the provisions of an Indiana statute regulating this vital
aspect of an employer-employee relationship. The effect of
this judicially interpolated requirement of localization is to
restrict the coverage of the act so that an award will be de-
nied an Indiana employee who performs all his work within
Indiana but whose employer is not localized in Indiana. More-
over the requirement has placed Indiana in the inconsistent
positions of affirming the conflicts rule of place of perform-
ance in order to hold the Indiana act inapplicable to a con-
tract performed wholly without the state,14 yet denying the
appropriateness of that same rule when the contract is to
be performed within Indiana if the employer is not localized
in Indiana. 15
This brief analysis of the opinions dealing with the cov-
erage of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act reveals
that that act fails to protect resident employees in two situa-
tions:
nois, but the employee was later sent to Indiana to perform. The
employer, a New York corporation, had complied with the statutes
permitting foreign corporations to do business in Indiana. The
court implied a new contract when the employee was sent to
perform in Indiana and held that that contract was covered
by the Indiana act because the employer's qualification to do
business in Indiana provided sufficient localization. The earlier
Darseh case was distinguished on the ground that there one em-
ployer ". . . had not localized itself, or qualified to do business
in the state, and, as fai as the record shows, had no place of
business in the state." Id. at 435.
The cases have said that "localized" means qualification to
do business in Indiana; appointment of a legal agent; main-
tenance of a place of business within the state; or, perhaps,
ownership of property within the state. But the term at best is
indefinite. It is arguable that hiring a salesman to perform
in Indiana should be sufficient to localize the employer.
13. Smith v. Menzies Shoe Co., 98 Ind. App. 132, 188 N. E. 592
(1934). Here the employer was a foreign corporation with an
office in Chicago where the contract was made. The employee,
a salesman, had Indiana as his territory. In a proceeding under
the Indiana act he was held to be outside its coverage.
14. See Johns-Manville v. Thrane, 80 Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229
(1923).




(1) A resident employee is not within the scope of the
statute, even if all the performance of the contract
is to take place in Indiana, if his employer is not
localized.6
(2) A resident employee is not within the scope of the
statute, even if his employer is localized, if all the
performance is to take place outside the state.
1 7
The court has frequently announced its appreciation of
the Workmen's Compensation Act's purpose. 18 Failure to ac-
cord all resident employees protection would seem to have
stemmed from the court's wish to avoid any possible ques-
tion which might be presented by the conceded due process
requirement that Indiana must have some connection with
the parties affected by the compensation act before that act
can be imposed upon a contract of employment. 9 But it is
difficult to accede to any position which would maintain that
Indiana cannot grant the protection of its statute to all resi-
dent employees without being guilty of insufficient deference
to the requirements of due process. It therefore becomes
pertinent to inquire how the two foregoing gaps in the Indi-
ana act may be remedied. Postponing consideration of the
obvious possibility of legislative amendment, the merits of
several devices available to the appellate court may be
examined.
Accepting the requirements of performance within the
state and localization of the employer, resident employees who
perform within the state can be brought within the act's
coverage by giving new content to the word "localization."
Operating within traditional concepts of agency the court
might reason that since the employee is performing for his
employer, his performance is sufficiently attributable to
16. Cf. Smith v. Menzies Shoe Co., 98 Ind. App. 132, 188 N. E. 592
(1934). It need hardly be pointed out that in such a
situation the employee would likewise be unable to recover under
the act of his employer's state if it, like the Indiana act, required
at least partial performance within the state.
17. Similarly, here, the employee will be precluded from any award
if the state of performance requires something more than that
performance for its act to apply, as, for example, that the con-
tract be formed within that state.
18. See e.g., Kunkler v. Mauck, 108 Ind. App. 98, 103, 27 N. E.2d 97,
99 (1939); In re Bowers, 65 Ind. App. 128, 132, 116 N. E. 842,
843 (1917).
19. See Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930).
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his employer-principal2o to justify a holding that the em-
ployer is localized. But this modification of the locali-
zation requirement would not cure the second of the two
situations of non-coverage, i.e., the resident employee whose
performance was wholly outside Indiana would not be cov-
ered by the act.
To provide for the employee performing outside Indiana
the court might discard the place of performance rule and
adopt the rule of place of formation.21  An early Indiana
case points in this direction.22  In that case the contract
was formed in Indiana between a resident employer and a
resident employee. The case does not indicate whether per-
formance in Indiana was contemplated. The court stated
that ". . . the employee's right to compensation arises out
of the contract. This right, being contractual, accompanies
the employee wherever he goes and abides with him until
the contract of service is terminated." 23 But this rule would
protect the resident employee who performs out of state
only if he entered into his contract within the state. Further,
it would not protect a resident employee who contracted
outside the state for performance within. Hence. endorse-
ment of the rule of place of formation would not work a
satisfactory solution, but would only succeed in substituting
new inadequacies for those which now exist.
Another possible means of extending the act's coverage
while still permitting adherence to the place of performance
rule would be the adoption of Wisconsin's fiction of "con-
structive status." As worked out by Wisconsin courts, this
device gives a resident employee a constructive status within
the state until he has acquired an "actual status as an em-
ployee in some other state. ' 24 But this fiction will not pro-
tect the resident who performs outside the state since he
thereby loses his constructive status. The fiction then is
20. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
21. See discussion supra p. 3.
22. Hagenbeck & Great Wallace Show Co. v. Leppert, 66 Ind. App.
261, 117 N. E. 531 (1917).
23. Id. at 267, 117 N. E. 533.
24. Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws-The
Restatement and Other Recent Developments, 20 MINN. L. Rsv.
19, 29 et seq. (1935). Constructive status was later said to mean
that the services were being constructively performed within Wis-
consin.
"Status" as a test of sufficient state interest was formulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Paramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923).
[Vol. 24
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unsatisfactory because it fails to remedy the second of the
gaps which exists in the act's coverage.
Finally, if the problem of coverage is to be solved judi-
cially, the theory which makes choice of law depend upon
a state's "contacts" may be suggested.25  Indeed there is
precedent in Indiana under which this concept could be ap-
plied to workmen's compensation cases, bringing the present-
ly excluded situations within the act's protection. In a rather
recent conflicts-contract case involving a cognovit note2 the
Indiana Supreme Court tentatively stated the contact theory
as follows: "The Court will consider all acts of the parties
touching the transaction in relation to the several states
involved and will apply as the law governing the transaction
the law of that state with which the facts are in most inti-
mate contact." 27  Under this theory the Indiana act un-
doubtedly could be held to cover those very situations which
at present the appellate court deems without the scope of
the act.
Since the deficiencies of the act can thus be remedied by
judicial use of the contact device, it would seem that the
matter might be left in the court's hands. But several
factors lead to the conclusion that the problem ought to be
dealt with by the General Assembly by way of amendment.
In the first place curative action, particularly in the work-
men's compensation field, is most appropriately a legislative
problem. Before the enactment of workmen's compensation
laws an estimated 80 per cent of employee's personal injury
actions were unsuccessful. 28 Even in the successful cases a
substantial part of the recovery was consumed in lawyers'
fees, doctors' bills and other expenses. Legislative action
was necessary to. shift the financial burden from the individ-
ual to industry as a whole because the courts, bound by stare
decisis and the common law defenses to tort actions, refused
to take the initiative in molding the law to meet the demands
of a highly industrialized society. Additional legislative
action is necessary again today because statutorily or judi-
25. See CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOoDmcIH AND GRISWOLD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 440 et seq. (2d ed. 1941).
26. Barber v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N. E.2d 417 (1945).
27. Id. at 586, 63 N. E.2d 423. The court stated the rule merely as
a test of the correctness of its conclusion and did not adopt it.




cially created exclusions, exemptions and exceptions have
limited the scope of present workmen's compensation acts
so that half the normal working population is still not pro-
tected.29 Thus the legislature is the traditional body to pro-
vide reform. Further the limited coverage accorded compen-
sation acts in part results from the fact that courts, as has
the Indiana court, deal with workmen's compensation cases
as a contract problem, and are therefore faced with the com-
plexities abounding in the contract area of conflict of laws.
The legislature is not so likely to be hampered by the limit-
ing impact of legal doctrines upon the central social fact
involved, viz., the fact that some employees are not given the
protection they are entitled to demand. Finally, legislative
revision may be more efficacious than judicial revision, since
apparently 0 only a small percentage of the compensation
cases go beyond the Industrial Board to the appellate court.
As a consequence it is quite possible that many claimants
do not receive awards because of the Board's misinterpreta-
tions or misapplications of the sometimes confusing and in-
articulate decisions of the appellate court. Legislative amend-
ment, explicitly extending coverage, would provide the Indus-
trial Board with clearer, more authoritative, and more ex-
peditious standards to guide it in granting awards to those
employees in the two categories which are at present unpro-
tected by the Indiana statute.
II
A draftsman who would undertake to amend the Indi-
ana Workmen's Compensation Act in an effort to give it the
greatest possible coverage would do well to remember that
he operates in a field which may not be solely domestic.
Other states, too, grant awards under their statutes. As the
coverage of a state's act is extended the possibility of con-
flicting awards increases, and the effect of an award by one
state on the potential award of another state must be con-
sidered. The problem may be illustrated by asking two ques-
tions: Can an "Indiana employee" 3' who has recovered an
29. Id. at v. The estimate was presumably valid as of 1944, the date
of publication of the book.
30. No information could be obtained from the Indiana Industrial
Commission on the number of awards which are appealed.
31. By "Indiana employee" is meant one who comes under the Indiana
act as presently judicially defined.
[Vol. 24
COMMENT
award in another state, for example Illinois, 32 recover an
additional award for the same injury in Indiana, if a credit
is given for the amount of compensation received in Illinois ?33
And, conversely, can an Indiana employee who has received
an award in Indiana be precluded by the Indiana award from
recovering an additional award for the same injury in Illi-
nois?
These questions have particular pertinence for Indiana
lawyers because, so far as can be learned, 4 no cases raising
these issues have come before the Industrial Board; nor are
there any Indiana judicial decisions on the subject. The
final determination of the extraterritorial effects of work-
men's compensation statutes and awards theretinder lies with
the United States Supreme Court and its application of the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.35
That Court's most recent consideration of the problem oc-
curred in the now familiar McCartin case.
36
The McCartin case held that a prior Illinois award of
32. Illinois, of course, must have a connection with the employment
contract or employee-employer relationship. Cf. note 19 supra.
An "Indiana employee" would be within the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act if his Indiana employer was a corporation
which also did business in Illinois, and if the contract of em-
ployment was made in Illinois. See ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 143, § 20
(Cum. Supp. 1947).
33. For example, the maximum award in Illinois for the loss of a
thumb is 50% of the average weekly wage for 70 weeks, while
in Indiana it is 55% of the average weekly wage for 60 weeks.
Conceivably the Indiana award may be for a larger amount. Com-
pare ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 143, § 23(e) (Cum. Supp. 1947) with
IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1303 (a) (Burns Repl. 1940).
If the employee has received an award in another state from
a different employer, this problem does not, of course, arise. See
Shelby M'f'g Co. v. Harris, 112 Ind. App. 627, 44 N. E.2d 315
(1942).
34. Inquiries made to the Indiana Industrial Board elicited no infor-
mation either as to whether these problems have been presented
to the board or as to how it might deal with them should they
be presented.
35. ". . . [no state] is bound, apart from the compulsion of the full
faith and credit clause, to enforce the laws of the other ...
This Court must determine for itself how far the . . .clause com-
pels the qualification or denial of rights asserted under the
laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute of another
state .... But there would seem to be little room for exercise
of that function when the statute of the forum is the expression
of domestic policy, in terms declared to be exclusive in its applica-
tion to persons and events within the state." Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493, 500-503 (1939).
36. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U. S. 622
(1947), 23 IND. L. J. 214 (1948).
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compensation did not, as a matter of constitutional law, bar
the injured employee from recovering an additional award
for the same injury from the Wisconsin Industrial Commis-
sion, where a credit was given for the previous Illinois award.
In the earlier Magnolia case 7 an award had been recovered
under the Texas act, which award was held to bar subsequent
proceedings brought under the Louisiana act for the same
injury. Although MoCartin's result was directly contrary,
Magnolia was not overruled. Instead the Court distinguished
the cases primarily on an alleged difference in statutory ter-
minology.38 The Court said that, unlike the Texas statute,
neither the Illinois statute nor the decisions under it evi-
denced an intention that the Illinois award be -exclusive, so
as to preclude recovery in another state for injuries received
there in the course of the Illinois employment.39
Assuming the distinction in statutory terminology re-
lied upon by the Supreme Court is determinative, to which
statute does the Indiana act correspond, and what effect does
it, and an award thereunder, have?
The Texas, Illinois and Indiana statutes include within
their coverage an employee whose injury is received outside
the state.40 Each statute provides that an election to recover
an award unler its provisions precludes any other form of
action against the employer.41 But in none of the statutes,
not even the Texas statute, is there express language of "ex-
clusiveness" which the Supreme Court in McCartin said had
been the controlling factor in the decision in the Magnolia
case.42 The one obvious distinction between the Texas statute
37. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943), 19 IND.
L. J. 268 (1943).
38. The secondary ground of distinction was the employee's reserva-
tion, in the Illinois award, of any rights which he might have
under the Wisconsin act. No such reservation had been made
in the Magnolia case.
39. 330 U. S. 622, 628 (1947).
40. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 8306, § 19 (1936); ILL. STAT. ANN.
c. 143, § 20 (Cune. Supp. 1947); IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1220 (Burns
Repl. 1940).
41. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 8306, § 3 (1936); ILL. STAT. ANN.
c. 143, § 21 (Cum. Supp. 1947); IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1206
(Burns Repl. 1940).
42. See the Court's explanation of its Magnolia decision in the Mc-
Cartin case: "The Court there found that the compensation award
under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law was made ex-
plicitly in lieu of any other recovery for injury to the employee,
precluding even a recovery under the laws of another state. ...
And since the Texas award had the degree of finality contem-
[Vol. 24
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on the one hand and the Illinois and Indiana statutes on the
other, is the unusual Texas provision which prohibits re-
covery under the Texas act by an employee who has recovered
in the state where the injury occurred. 43  It has been sug-
gested that this provision was an influential factor in de-
termining the Court's decision in Magnolia,44 i.e., since Texas
considered a foreign award a bar to recovery under its
statute, it must also consider its award a bar to a subsequent
foreign recovery. On the level of this distinction, then, the
McCartin rule applies with equal force to an Indiana award.
Indiana can by judicial or statutory pronouncement inter-
polate into the Indiana act a policy favoring exclusiveness,
and an Indiana award will thereby bar additional awards
in all other states. If Indiana makes no such policy state-
ment, then other states may, if they choose,45 give an addi-
tional award under their own statutes with a credit for the
prior Indiana award.46  And, conversely, Indiana should be
free to grant or refuse to grant an additional award to an
employee who has recovered in a foreign jurisdiction if that
foreign award is not "exclusive.
' 47
Numerous explanations have been given for the Mc-
Cartin decision, 4 the most realistic, if least "legal," implying
that the Court of 1947 regarded workmen's compensation
cases more favorably than did the Court of 1943.49 The line
of Supreme Court cases 0 culminating in the McCartin doc-
trine may be explained on a ground advanced by the Court
itself in Magnolia. There the Court suggested a distinction
under the full faith and credit clause between the effect to
be given a statute of a state as compared with a judgment.
plated by the full faith and credit clause, it was held that
Louisiana was constitutionally forbidden from entering a subse-
quent award under its statute." 330 U. S. 622, 626, 627 (1947).
43. TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. Art. 8306, § 19 (1936).
44. Note, 33 CORN. L. Q. 310, 315 n.29 (1947).
45. Such a choice rests entirely within that state's domestic policy
and is not a constitutional question. Hence the Illinois court's
refusal to apply its own statute where a proceeding was also
pending under the Indiana statute would probably not occur again.
See Cole v. Industrial Commission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520
(1933).
46. See 23 IND. L. J. 214, 218 (1947) ; 33 CORN. L. Q. 310, 313 (1947);
60 HAaV. L. REV. 993 (1947).
47. See note 34 supra.
48. See note 45 supra. And see 47 COL. L. REV. 846 (1947).
49. 33 CORN. L. Q. 310, 312 (1947).
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The forum need not give credit to an allegedly exclusive for-
eign statute which is raised as a defense to a proceeding
under the forum's own workmen's compensation statute.51
Although the statutes may conflict, the interest of the for-
eign state is not superior to the interest of the state of the
forum. But where an award has been given, the interest of
the state which gave the award may override the interest of
the forum. Therefore even though the forum favors an addi-
tional award, it will be precluded from granting it by virtue
of the full faith and credit clause.5 2 This distinction the
Court drew both from the language of the full faith and
credit clause and the Statute of 1790,53 and from the Court's
then conception of the office of the full faith and credit
clause54 As to most litigation the distinction may make
sense. However as the dissent in Magnolia pointed out, the
broad coverage intended to be given under workmen's com-
pensation statutes is partly defeated if the distinction be-
tween a workmen's compensation statute and an award under
that statute is made explicit.55  The dissent of Magnolia may,
through McCartin, represent the view of the Court today.
50. For a good brief analysis of these cases see 33 CORN. L. Q. 313
et seq. (1947).
51. Compare Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Acci. Comm'n,
294 U. S. 532 (1935) (where California, the state of employ-
ment, gave an award to an employee injured in Alaska) with
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Comm'n, 306 U. S.
493 (1939) (where California, the state of injury, gave an award
to a Massachusetts employee).
52. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U. S. 622
(1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943).
53. See 320 U. S. 430 at 437 (1943).
54. The Court said the purpose of the full faith and credit clause,
like the commerce clause, was that of a nationally unifying force,
establishing the "salutary principle" of the common law that a
litigation once pursued to judgment is conclusive of the rights
of the parties in every other court, so that a cause of action
merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every
other. Id. at 439. Cf. 60 HARv. L. Rav. 993 (1947).
55. "The argument of state interest is hardly less compelling when
Louisiana chooses to reject as decisive of the issues of the case
a foreign judgment than when it rejects a foreign statute ...
Where two states both have a legitimate interest in the outcome
of workmen's compensation litigation, the question of whether the
second state . . . should abide by the decision of the first is a
question of policy which should be decided by the state legislatures
and courts. . . . State laws vary, and uniformity is not the
highest value in the law of workmens' compensation ... " 320
U. S. 430, 456, 459 (1943).
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